

# Anna Craycroft

# Motion into Being

**NEW  
235 BOWERY  
NEW YORK NY  
10002 USA  
MUSEUM**

January 17–  
May 13, 2018

# Frames of Reference

The English words animal and animation both derive from the Latin root *animare*, which literally means “to give breath to.” But who or what exactly *is* that giver of breath, and who or what receives it? Animated entities are usually understood to speak and move at the will of their creator. Borrowing from the conventions of vaudeville, puppetry, and the sideshow, early animations revel in slapstick and offer comedies of uncouth manners; figures plot to overturn their station only to be met by a deliciously nasty comeuppance, their stories littered with running gags. Gag comes into English by way of the Norse term *gaghals*, which means to throw one’s neck backward, as if choking or unable to speak—or, for that matter, breathe. The term is first recorded in the United States as slang to designate a joke in 1863, two years before the end of the Civil War. Before then, an order commonly known as the “Gag Rule” blocked anti-slavery petitions from being discussed in the House of Representatives. The gag locates power in the figure’s mouth: a site for speech and utterance, expressing both desire and disgust.

For artist Anna Craycroft, the ways in which identity, agency, and ownership are articulated in animated films are the subject of fascination and intensive research. These films act as a kind of case study for her investigations into longstanding yet constantly evolving debates around the moral principles of (human) life. Questions of who and what qualifies as a person have become increasingly contentious as the agency of all beings—from animals and ecosystems to corporations and artificial intelligence—has fractured legal and theoretical discourse. Craycroft’s residency and exhibition “Motion into Being,” presented as part of the Spring 2018 R&D Season: ANIMATION at the New Museum, creates a platform for the ongoing investigation of the construction of personhood and its political, social, and ethical import. The film that Craycroft will produce plays with both abstraction and figuration, nodding to the work of Mary Ellen Bute and Oskar Fischinger, among others. As these pioneering filmmakers recognized, when we watch a shape—whether abstract or not—move and respond to its environment, we cannot help but ascribe sentient properties to it. Forms that even hint at representation appear to have character, instincts, and a story.

The structure of Craycroft’s installation borrows from early stop-motion animation techniques like the twentieth-century setback camera, which gave the illusion of cartoons moving through real space by filming animation cells on a horizontal glass plane placed in front of a miniature forced perspective set [Fig. 1]. Within this system, the camera points at a diorama of sorts, composed of a blend of three-dimensional objects and two-dimensional images. The history of the diorama and the camera are in fact closely entwined. Louis Daguerre, one of the first innovators of camera devices, was an early proprietor of the diorama as a form of popular entertainment in nineteenth-century Paris. Light is critical to both: in Daguerre’s time, diorama sets were illuminated by a series of changing colored lights that would flicker on and off as elements within the scene moved and morphed, pulled by a series of invisible strings; a camera similarly produces images through careful control of the device’s exposure to light. Craycroft has transformed the Museum’s Fifth Floor Gallery into an oversized setback camera, using its glass wall to mount her animation cells and the gallery space as a changing diorama set. When visitors enter the space, they quite literally step onto the stage of animated debates.

Upon exiting the elevator, viewers enter directly into Craycroft’s set. Her props, upright or hanging from the ceiling, are resolutely still while the exhibition is open to the public, frozen in the places where she last

left them; on Mondays, however, when the Museum is closed, they start to stir and shift—much like the dolls and toys suspected of coming alive when a child is not looking. Craycroft moves the props, but in the final animated sequence, her role in their motion is erased, so they appear to move of their own will. Perhaps most immediately striking about Craycroft’s set is its starkness: the walls, floor, and objects within it are all painted black, white, and grey. These tones are the most basic way of measuring depth and the light that a camera can capture. Using such measurements, photographers determine how long to expose film to light in order to produce a legible image. On the floor of the exhibition, curved lines and triangular markings note how the eye perceives depth and movement, which stems from how the brain reconciles slightly different inputs from the right and left eyes. Though scientific principles dictate how this operates, not all human bodies receive the same sensory data or reconcile it in the same way. Moving outside of the human world, for instance, animals and insects understand depth, space, and motion in radically divergent ways. Ultimately, Craycroft’s project asks: How do we understand nonhuman forms and beings on their own terms?

Craycroft’s use of animated film to visualize legal, theoretical, and ethical boundaries between the human and nonhuman is a complicated intervention. Throughout history, there has been enormous power in deciding what is animate (living) and who can animate (imbue life). The history of animated cartoons bears the markings of these negotiations and attributions. It is well recorded that early animated cartoons like Mickey Mouse—with his exaggerated features, large eyes, and white mouth and gloves—drew explicitly from blackface minstrels. Like the white minstrel actor, early cartoonists animated blackness to their own ends, often depicting a juvenile and unruly blackface cartoon that seemed to, as scholar Nicholas Sammond puts it, “assert its independence from the social and material order of its making . . . only inevitably to be put in its place.”<sup>1</sup> Craycroft’s work both acknowledges and pushes against these legacies.

In *Animacies*, an expansive study of the porous and political boundaries between the human and nonhuman, scholar Mel Y. Chen begins by introducing the linguistic concept of the “animacy hierarchy”: a scale of sentience from the animate to the inanimate embedded in semantic constructions, which “conceptually arranges human life, disabled life, animal life, plant life, and forms of nonliving material in orders of value and priority.”<sup>2</sup> While dehumanization and objectification are well-worn tactics of oppression, Chen reveals how these methods of subjugation are even woven into our language. Clear examples in English can be found in the pronouns we choose—using “it” as opposed to “he,” “she,” or “they” to describe an animal or plant, for instance—and in our use of the preposition “of” for possession; it is preferable to say “the face of the clock” (not “the clock’s face”), but “the man’s face” (not “the face of the man”). This linguistic mapping of “liveness” is, as Chen deftly articulates, an inherently political construction with far-ranging implications in terms of how we navigate race, class, gender, sexuality, and disability. Like many other power structures, it also has the ability to hide in plain sight, reifying hierarchies through subtle linguistic conventions.

The language of animacy, and the normative priorities it betrays, demonstrate the many ways we constellate the human and nonhuman.<sup>3</sup> Of course, animations make these distinctions messy. Clocks often literally speak—look at Cogsworth, the pendulum clock in Disney’s *Beauty and the Beast* (1991). Animals are often (if temporarily) placed on the same plane as humans. In the 1936 animated short film *Be Human*, released by

Fleischer Studios, Betty Boop sings, “Be human, animals can cry / Be human, it’s easy if you try . . . Don’t think you’re wonderful just because / You weren’t born with a tail and claws.” In her residency and exhibition, Craycroft attends to these entangled narratives of personhood, moving beyond the purely linguistic to investigate the power structures that surface in the stories we tell: how we imagine the agency of humans and nonhumans in fairytales and myths, in the frames of animated cartoons, and across legal arguments and definitions.

Legal debates around personhood are the starting point for Craycroft’s ongoing study of identity and ownership. There is a long and complicated history of parsing the legal standing of those deemed nonhuman in court—one bound up with histories of slavery and the oppression of subjugated people defined as property. More recently, these legal debates have been reworked in relation to women’s reproductive rights, the rights of animals and the environment, and the rise of corporate power. The recognition of nontraditional personhood has been newly tested by an international trend of listing nonhuman subjects as plaintiffs in lawsuits. In the United States, for instance, animal rights groups like PETA and the Nonhuman Rights Project have filed copyright and habeas corpus suits on behalf of monkeys, who are listed as the plaintiffs in the cases.<sup>4</sup> This past September, a suit was filed in Federal District Court in Colorado “by” the Colorado River Ecosystem, for its “right to exist, flourish, regenerate, be restored, and naturally evolve.”<sup>5</sup> This, of course, comes amid the drastic expansion of corporate personhood in this country—the claim that corporations hold the same legal status and protections, such as the right to free speech, as human beings. Attempts to expand the legal status of humans to cover animal, environmental, and corporate subjects lie at a murky intersection between anthropocentric and post-humanist discourse: they project human status onto nonhuman subjects by anthropomorphizing them and, at the same time, radically expand what it may mean to be a rights-bearing subject beyond the human.

At stake in Craycroft’s project is perhaps one of the most fundamental, even existential inquiries: What is it to be human? Yet in our moment of heightened ecological, political, and representational crisis, a second question now haunts this first one: Why is “human” still an elevated category, if indeed it ever was? In our lifetimes, the very concept of the human as evolved—as “top of the food chain”—is crumbling. Craycroft’s inquiry into animation in all its valences suggests, if obliquely, that we reconsider our assumptions and look again—frame by frame.

—Johanna Burton, Sara O’Keeffe, and Kate Wiener




Figure 1. Fleischer Studios’ setback camera, for producing three-dimensional effects in animation, roughly similar to Disney’s multiplane camera. From the patent by Max Fleischer, “Art of making motion picture cartoons.” Figure 1, detail. Source: Google Patents

- 1 Nicholas Sammond, *Birth of an Industry: Blackface Minstrelsy and the Rise of American Animation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 110.
- 2 Mel Y. Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 13.
- 3 The monkey, humankind’s closest evolutionary ancestor, has also become a central figure in Craycroft’s research. In her book *Primate Visions*, Donna Haraway contends that monkeys and apes have long been a source of interest, anxiety, and projection because they embody what it means to be “almost human.” The monkey looms disturbingly as the uncanny figure of our repressed origins (and proof that there is no easy animal/human divide). Moreover, the trope of comparing a human to a monkey has long been wielded as a tool of racist, colonialist, and sexist dehumanization, intended to mark the supposed evolutionary inferiority of certain subjects.
- 4 See THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on Behalf of TOMMY, Appellant, v. PATRICK C. LAVERY, Individually and as an Officer of CIRCLE L TRAILER SALES, INC., et al., Respondents, 152 A.D.3d 73, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) and NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC., and ANTJE ENGELHARDT, PhD Plaintiff, v. DAVID JOHN SLATER, an individual, BLURB, INC., a Delaware corporation, and WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD., a United Kingdom private limited company, Defendants, 15-cv-4324 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
- 5 See discussion of Colorado River v. State of Colorado in Julie Turkewitz, “Corporations Have Rights. Why Shouldn’t Rivers?,” *New York Times*, September 26, 2017.





“Legal persons’ possess inherent value; ‘legal things,’ possessing merely instrumental value, exist for the sake of legal persons.”<sup>1</sup>

—Memo of Law in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Beulah v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, LLI-CV-17-5009822-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2017) (citing 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England \*16 (1765-69))


“[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their ‘personhood’ often serves as a useful legal fiction.

But they are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”<sup>2</sup>

—Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

“The ordinary corporation is a ‘person’ for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes. So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modern life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes. . . . The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it.”<sup>3</sup>

—Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 US 727, 742-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)



Quotes collected by Anna Craycroft with Kate Wiener. All citations and summaries researched and written by Kate Wiener. Drawings by Anna Craycroft.

1 In the November 2017 Memo of Law in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of three elephants, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., an organization fighting for the legal recognition of nonhuman animals’ fundamental rights, cited William Blackstone as grounds for articulating the personhood of nonhuman animals. Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69) has served as a seminal text for the interpretation of English and American Law.

2 In this landmark case, the Court ruled that political spending by groups such as corporations and unions is protected free speech under the First Amendment. The Court recognized the legal personhood of corporations and their expenditure of money as a form of protected speech. In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stevens argued that corporate electioneering is not political expression protected by the First Amendment and that corporations should only be considered legal persons when the fiction serves the interest of human beings.

3 In 1972, the Sierra Club, a nonprofit environmental organization, brought suit against the US government to argue for an injunction to prevent federal officials from granting permits to develop the Mineral King Valley, an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest in California. Walt Disney Enterprises had just won a bid to start surveying the land in the hopes of developing an expansive ski resort. Although the Supreme Court ruled against the Sierra Club, holding that they did not have standing to sue, in his dissenting opinion Justice Douglas made a case for the personhood of the river and the larger ecosystem. Douglas described the environment as a living body that nourishes other forms of life and has the capacity to feel the destructive pains of modern industrial development.

4 In Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and Payment, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), the Court ruled that corporations cannot avoid paying state-based unemployment taxes to states in which they conduct business, and state courts have jurisdiction over corporations even if they are not “residents” of the state. The Court held that, because a corporation is a legal fiction, its “presence” within a jurisdiction can only be determined by its business activities, not its physical headquarters.

5 In Hale v. Henkel, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations. The Court compelled the corporations under investigation to produce extensive records that revealed their misconduct.

6 In 2014, the New Zealand government signed a deed of settlement to with the Whanganui Iwi, indigenous Māori peoples with historical claims to the Whanganui River. In accordance with Whanganui Iwi belief that the River is a living ancestor, the deed recognizes the River as an indivisible living entity with legal rights, and the “inseparability of the people and the river.” This quote is from the apology section of the deed, which recognizes the Crown’s wrongdoing in assuming unlawful control of the River and failing to account for historical grievances.

7 In the Dred Scott decision, the court ruled that African Americans, whether emancipated or enslaved, could never be citizens of the United States—a devastating blow to the legal recognition of African-American personhood. They held that because African Americans were not originally intended to be recognized as citizens in the Constitution, as they were all enslaved at the time, they could not retroactively claim the rights and privileges of a citizen.

8 In a policy statement released by the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, they recognized the personhood of dolphins and banned the capture of dolphins for commercial entertainment. The Ministry drew on dolphins’ human-like capacity for intellectual thought and emotional sensitivity to justify this ban.


9 In September 2017, the Colorado River brought suit against the State of Colorado by way of their legal “next friend,” or proxy, Deep Green Resistance. Their complaint argued that the River, akin to a person, has “certain rights to flourish, regenerate, and naturally evolve,” and that the state should be liable for violating these rights. This precedent-setting and currently undecided case names the Colorado River as a plaintiff, in an attempt to legally assert the rights-bearing personhood of the River.

10 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014), the Court ruled that “closely held” secular, for-profit corporations have federally recognized religious freedom, and that, as a result, they cannot be forced to provide contraceptive coverage for women, as is required in the Affordable Care Act, if doing so would substantially burden their religious expression. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg called the majority opinion “a decision of startling breadth,” and argued that the decision had profound consequences for women’s health and set a dangerous precedent, opening the door for religious organizations and corporations to opt out of laws. She drew a distinction between the religious freedoms granted to natural persons and artificial persons.

11 In this watershed case, the Court legalized gay marriage, ruling that all states must license marriages between two people of the same sex. The Court contended that marriage is a fundamental human tradition and to deny this right to any couple is to disregard their humanity or “diminish their personhood.”

“The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. . . . They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is whether the class of persons described in the plea [A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves] in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty?”<sup>7</sup>

—Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393, 404 (1857)




“. . . cetaceans in general are highly intelligent and sensitive, and various scientists who have researched dolphin behavior have suggested that the unusually high intelligence as compared to other animals means that dolphins should be seen as ‘nonhuman persons’ and as such should have their own specific rights and is morally unacceptable to keep them captive for entertainment purpose.”<sup>8</sup>

—Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, policy statement banning captive dolphin shows, 2015

“As a practical matter, the difficulty in recognizing this equitable concept (of conferring standing and rights on Natural entities) arises from the fact that nature—which any of us who have spent a day in the Rockies or along the Colorado would never describe as ‘inanimate’—does not have the ability to hire a law firm, actively participate in its representation, or testify in Court. (One shudders at the idea of nature testifying against us. That said, in many real ways, it is testifying against us right now.)”<sup>9</sup>

—Complaint, The Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, 1:17-cv-02316 ¶ 39 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2017)



“...the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities.”<sup>10</sup>


—Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)

“Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”<sup>11</sup>

—Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015)

“Whatever his status under immigration laws, an alien is a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of the term . . . the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State’s territory.”<sup>12</sup>

—Plyler v. Doe, 457 US 202, 210 (1982)



“[R]obots’ autonomy raises the question of their nature in the light of the existing legal categories—of whether they should be regarded as natural persons, legal persons, animals, or objects—or whether a new category should be created, with its own specific features and implications as regards the attribution of rights and duties, including liability for damage.”<sup>15</sup>


—Draft Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, European Parliament, at 5 (NIL 21031) (May 31, 2016)

“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality—properties by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual.”<sup>13</sup>

—Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)

“[A]nimals are the protected rather than the protectors. . . . Animals are not authorized to sue in their own names to protect themselves. There is no hint in the definition of ‘person’ in § 1532(13) that the ‘person’ authorized to bring suit to protect an endangered or threatened species can be an animal that is itself endangered or threatened.”<sup>14</sup>

—Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2004)



“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”<sup>16</sup>

—Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973)

“. . . unlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their actions. In our view, it is this incapability to bear any legal responsibilities and societal duties that renders it inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights—such as the fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus—that have been afforded to human beings.”<sup>17</sup>


—New York ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 124 A.D.3d 148, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)

“As humans bereft of consciousness are entitled to personhood, courts must either recognize an elephant’s just equality claim to bodily liberty or reject the principle of equality.”<sup>18</sup>

—Memo of Law in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Beulah v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, LLI-CV-17-5009822-S at 18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2017)

“[Y]es, women are persons . . . and eligible to be summoned and may become Members of the Senate of Canada. The exclusion of women from all public offices is a relic of days more barbarous than ours. And to those who would ask why the word ‘person’ should include females, the obvious answer is, why should it not?”<sup>19</sup>

—Lord Sankey, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, October 18, 1929, reversal of Supreme Court ruling in Edwards v. A.G. of Canada (1928)



13 In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to challenge the corporate charter of Dartmouth College, changing it from a private institution to a state-run public university. The court ruled in favor of the College, protecting its right as a private corporation to create and maintain contract safe from the interference of the state. Chief Justice Marshall’s definition of a corporation, as outlined in the decision of this case, has been foundational for future understandings of corporate personhood.

14 In 2004, the Cetacean Community, a term used to designate the world’s population of whales, porpoises, and dolphins, sued the US Government over the Navy’s wartime use of sonar technology. The underwater noise from the sonar was argued to be so loud that it physically traumatized and disoriented cetaceans, negatively affecting their ability to feed, mate, and flourish. The Court ruled against the Cetacean Community, holding that they did not qualify as persons with the right to bring suit in their own names to protect themselves, under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, or the National Environmental Protection Act.

15 In a 2016 motion for a European Parliament Resolution, the Committee of Legal Affairs called for a reconsideration of the legal status of robots as persons, given the increasing sophistication of artificial intelligence. The Committee considered the new legal classification of “electronic persons,” to account for unprecedented liability issues brought on by increasingly autonomous robots.

16 In this landmark case for women’s reproductive rights, the Court held that a woman’s right to an abortion is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, under the right to privacy clause. A person may choose to have an abortion up to the point in which the fetus is viable, meaning it can survive outside the womb. The Court held that the unviable fetus is not a “person,” as is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

17 Since 2013, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NhRP), an organization fighting for the legal recognition of nonhuman animals’ fundamental rights, has represented Tommy, a male chimpanzee movie actor who has been kept in captivity since birth. They filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Tommy, arguing that he had been unlawfully imprisoned. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department ruled against NhRP, holding that Tommy is not a legal person entitled to enforce his rights by habeas corpus. NhRP has continued to fight for Tommy’s rights and is in the midst of ongoing litigation.

18 Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. has recently represented Beulah, Minnie, and Karen, three elephants who are owned by and forced to perform in circuses and fairs at the Commerford Zoo in Connecticut. In November 2017, NhRP filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the Connecticut Superior Court, Litchfield County on behalf of the elephants. In a memo in support of the petition, NhRP argued that elephants, as legal persons, have a right to bodily liberty—a liberty that is violated by their unlawful detention. They likened the elephants to incapacitated or incompetent human beings who are appointed a guardian to protect their bodily liberties.

19 In 1928, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that women were not legal persons, and as such could not serve on the Senate. One year later the Court’s decision was overturned by the Privy Council of England, at the time the highest court in Canada, affirming women’s status as persons and their right to hold public office. This was a landmark case for women’s rights in Canada.



## Public Programs

Beyond Human: Frameworks for Fundamental Rights  
Thursday March 29, 7 PM

Bringing together leading scholars and cultural critics, this panel discussion will consider the legal and ethical implications of expanded definitions of personhood. Panelists include Adrian Chen, Karla F.C. Holloway, Kelly Oliver, and Sunaura Taylor, with Megan Hicks serving as moderator.

Persona Non Granted by Will Rawls  
Saturday April 14, 5 PM

Artist Will Rawls will respond to Craycroft's anthropomorphic animation project with three episodes exploring her objects as props and bodies, while investigating his own limited potential to fake animation. Interacting with the objects and media in Craycroft's exhibition, Rawls will scrutinize surface, storytelling, space, and texture to choreograph this series of unfortunate "persons."

Toward an Ethics of Animation:  
Screening and Conversation with Anna Craycroft and Gloria Sutton  
Thursday May 10, 7 PM

Following the premiere of Craycroft's stop-motion animation film, a lively conversation with art historian Gloria Sutton will unpack Craycroft's project and examine the ways that animation—the movement of images and bodies—articulates new questions about sense and meaning within contemporary digital culture.

## List of Works


*Storyboards and Setboards*, 2018  
Paper, ink, and metal hooks  
20 x 30 in (50.8 x 76.2 cm) each

*Set, Theater, and Library*, 2018  
Wood, casters, hanging hardware, fabric, plaster, paper, latex paint, acetate, Plexiglas, projection screen, books, binders, viewfinder, and camera  
Dimensions variable

*Animation*, 2018  
Single-channel video, color; duration variable

All works courtesy the artist  
Textile props designed in collaboration with and fabricated by  
Kelsey Knight Mohr  
Wooden props constructed with John Ralston  
Seating Library fabricated by Jillian Clark

Special thanks to the New Museum exhibitions team: Walsh Hansen, Jillian Clark, Kevin Kelly, and Christine Navin



Anna Craycroft, *Template for Storyboards*, 2018. Courtesy the artist



## Anna Craycroft

Anna Craycroft was born in Oregon in 1975 and raised in New York. She has had solo shows at Ben Maltz Gallery, Los Angeles (2017); Portland Institute for Contemporary Art, Portland, OR (2013); the Blanton Museum of Art, Austin, TX (2010); Tracy Williams Ltd., New York (2008, 2009, 2011); and Le Case D'Arte, Milan (2005). She has had two-person exhibitions at Fundació Joan Miró, Barcelona (2015); REDCAT, Los Angeles (2014); and Sandroni Rey, Los Angeles (2007). Craycroft recently debuted a major new work, *The Earth Is a Magnet*, commissioned for the ICA Boston exhibition "The Artist's Museum" (2016). Other notable group exhibitions include "Champs Elysees" at Palais de Tokyo, Paris (2013), and MoMA P.S.1's "Greater New York" (2005). She has received commissions for public sculpture from Socrates Sculpture Park (2004), the Lower Manhattan Cultural Center (2005), and Art in General (2006), New York, and from Den Haag Sculptuur, The Hague (2008).

Artist commissions at the New Museum are generously supported by the Neeson / Edlis Artist Commissions Fund.

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Laurie Wolfert

The Council for Artists Research and Residencies  
of the New Museum

Additional support is provided by:  
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